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New Prime Inc. v. Oliveira: Putting the Wheels Back on the 
FAA’s Section 1 Exemption for Transportation Workers 
I. Introduction 
Arbitration is ubiquitous in modern-day America.
1
 Since the early 
twentieth century, there has been a burgeoning trend of consumer contracts 
and employment agreements containing provisions that require disputes 
arising under the agreement to be resolved in an arbitral forum.
2
 Today, 
millions of American consumers
3
 and approximately a quarter of American 
nonunion employees
4
 are subject to mandatory arbitration agreements. 
However, the wide use—and, often, blind acceptance—of arbitration 
agreements is not without controversy. According to its largely corporate 
proponents, arbitration is viewed as a means to wholly control adjudication 
of disputes arising out of contract.
5
 Antagonists, however, maintain that the 
often one-sided mandatory arbitration agreements deny customers and 
employees the unique advantages that a judicial proceeding affords.
6
 
                                                                                                             
 1. See Knepp v. Credit Acceptance Corp. (In re Knepp), 229 B.R. 821, 828 (Bankr. 
N.D. Ala. 1999) (“Arbitration was innocuous when limited to negotiated commercial 
contracts, but it developed sinister characteristics when it became ubiquitous.”). 
 2. See KATHERINE V.W. STONE & ALEXANDER J.S. COLVIN, ECON. POLICY INST., THE 
ARBITRATION EPIDEMIC: MANDATORY ARBITRATION DEPRIVES WORKERS AND CONSUMERS OF 
THEIR RIGHTS 3–4 (2015), http://www.epi.org/files/2015/arbitration-epidemic.pdf. 
 3. CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, ARBITRATION STUDY: REPORT TO CONGRESS, 
PURSUANT TO DODD-FRANK WALL STREET REFORM AND CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT § 
1028(A) 9 (2015), http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201503_cfpb_arbitration-study-report-
to-congress-2015.pdf. 
 4. STONE & COLVIN, supra note 2, at 15. 
 5. Corporate drafters can structure arbitration agreements to achieve a litany of goals 
such as: confidentiality, avoiding adherence to the Federal Rules of Evidence and Civil 
Procedure, immunity from class action, avoidance of jury trial, avoidance of appeal, etc. See, 
e.g., Oxford Health Plans LLC v. Sutter, 569 U.S. 564, 565 (2013) (“Class arbitration is a 
matter of consent: An arbitrator may employ class procedures only if the parties have 
authorized them.”); AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 345 (2011) (“[T]he 
informality of arbitral proceedings is itself desirable, reducing the cost and increasing the 
speed of dispute resolution.”) (citing 14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett, 556 U.S. 247, 269 (2009); 
Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 628 (1985)); First 
Options of Chi., Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 942 (1995) (noting that under the Federal 
Arbitration Act, courts may vacate an arbitrator’s decision “only in very unusual 
circumstances”); Mitsubishi Motors, 473 U.S. at 628 (“By agreeing to arbitrate a statutory 
claim, a party . . . trades the procedures and opportunity for review of the courtroom for the 
simplicity, informality, and expedition of arbitration.”). 
 6. See STONE & COLVIN, supra note 2, at 26; see also Taylor J. Freeman Peshehonoff, 
Title VII’s Deficiencies Affect #MeToo: A Look at Three Ways Title VII Continues to Fail 
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This Note will analyze New Prime Inc. v. Oliveira, in which the Supreme 
Court examined the scope of the Federal Arbitration Act’s (“FAA” or 
“Act”) section 1 exemption and, for the first time in modern arbitration 
jurisprudence, seized back some of the power that it had historically 
relinquished in light of a supposed federal policy in favor of arbitration.
7
 
Part II provides a background of the Act, the Court’s historical treatment of 
cases in which questions of arbitrability arise, and the circuit split that gave 
rise to the Court’s review of the section 1 exemption. Part III describes the 
facts surrounding New Prime Inc. v. Oliveira and analyzes the Court’s 
reasoning. Part IV argues that courts have historically misapplied 
Congress’s intent behind enacting the FAA and gone too far in allowing 
arbitrators the authority to decide the limits of their own jurisdiction but 
have now appropriately seized the opportunity to set forth a clear and 
correct interpretation of the Act. Finally, Part V briefly concludes by setting 
forth a few key questions that can only be answered through time and 
further judicial interpretation. 
II. Law Before New Prime 
A. The Federal Arbitration Act 
Before 1925, both state and federal courts showed great hostility towards 
the enforcement of arbitration agreements.
8
 Evidencing this trend, the 
                                                                                                             
America’s Workforce, 72 OKLA. L. REV. 479, 515–16 (2020) (arguing that the often secretive 
nature of arbitration eliminates many of the protections employment statutes, such as Title 
VII, sought to create). 
 7. Compare Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24–25 
(1983) (noting “a liberal federal policy favoring arbitration” and establishing the principle 
that “any doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues should be resolved in favor of 
arbitration”) (emphasis added), with H.R. REP. NO. 68-96, at 1 (1924) (noting that the 
purpose of enacting the FAA was to place agreements to arbitrate disputes “upon the same 
footing as other contracts, where it belongs”) (emphasis added). 
 8. The House Report, generated as part of Congress’s enactment of the Federal 
Arbitration Act, summarizes the history of judicial hostility as: 
Some centuries ago, because of the jealousy of the English courts for their own 
jurisdiction, they refused to enforce specific agreements to arbitrate upon the 
ground that the courts were thereby ousted from their jurisdiction. This jealousy 
survived for so long a period that the principle became firmly embedded in the 
English common law and was adopted with it by the American courts. The 
courts have felt that the precedent was too strongly fixed to be overturned 
without legislative enactment, although they have frequently criticized the rule 
and recognized its illogical nature and the injustice which results from it. The 
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol72/iss3/7
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Supreme Court affirmed in Insurance Co. v. Morse that “[e]very citizen is 
entitled to resort to all the courts of the country, and to invoke the 
protection which all the laws or all those courts may afford him.”9 Further, 
while a citizen is free to bind himself to arbitration, “[h]e cannot . . . bind 
himself in advance by an agreement, which may be specifically enforced, 
thus to forfeit his rights at all times and on all occasions, whenever the case 
may be presented.”10 In response to this hostility, and with an express intent 
to place arbitration agreements on the same footing as any other contract,
11
 
Congress promulgated the United States Arbitration Act,
12
 which was 
codified in 1947,
13
 and is known today as the Federal Arbitration Act.
14
 The 
FAA contains fifteen distinct sections with the most widely cited provisions 
being sections 1, 2, 3, and 4.  
While this Note will focus on the jurisdictional exemption contained 
within section 1 of the Act, a cursory overview of each of the first four 
sections is necessary to appreciate the judicial analysis required to resolve 
disputes in which one party moves to compel arbitration.  
Section 1 establishes the Act’s scope of application.15 The FAA applies 
to contracts that contain arbitration agreements in two areas of federal 
jurisdiction: “[m]aritime transactions” and “commerce.”16 The text of 
section 1, however, expressly exempts “contracts of employment of 
seamen, railroad employees, or any other class of workers engaged in 
foreign or interstate commerce.”17 
Section 2 of the FAA “is the primary substantive provision,”18 and 
substantively provides that “[a] written provision . . . to settle by arbitration 
                                                                                                             
bill declares simply that such agreements for arbitration shall be enforced, and 
provides a procedure in the Federal courts for their enforcement. 
H.R. REP. NO. 68-96, at 1–2. 
 9. 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 445, 451 (1874). 
 10. Id. 
 11. The House Report accompanying the FAA states plainly that “[a]rbitration 
agreements are purely matters of contract,” and that the purpose of enacting the legislation 
was to place agreements to arbitrate disputes “upon the same footing as other contracts, 
where it belongs.” H.R. REP. NO. 68-96, at 1.  
 12. United States Arbitration Act, ch. 213, 43 Stat. 883, 886 (1925). 
 13. Federal Arbitration Act, ch. 392, 61 Stat. 669, 669 (1947). 
 14. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1–16 (2018). 
 15. Id. § 1; see, e.g., Citizens Bank v. Alafabco, Inc., 539 U.S. 52, 56–57 (2003); Circuit 
City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 112 (2001); Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. 
Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 274–76 (1995). 
 16. 9 U.S.C. § 1. 
 17. Id. 
 18. Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983). 
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a controversy thereafter arising out of such contract . . . shall be valid, 
irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in 
equity for the revocation of any contract.”19 Section 2 validates arbitration 
agreements as contracts and expressly manifests Congress’s intent to ensure 
that arbitration agreements would hold “the same footing as [all] other 
contracts.”20  
Sections 3 and 4 direct courts to stay the proceedings before them and 
compel arbitration.
21
 Section 3 provides, in part, that “the court . . . upon 
being satisfied that the issue involved . . . is referable to arbitration under 
[the underlying contract], shall on application of one of the parties stay the 
trial of the action until such arbitration has been had in accordance with the 
terms of the agreement.”22 Section 4 furnishes that “upon being satisfied 
that the making of the agreement for arbitration . . . is not in issue, the court 
shall make an order directing the parties to proceed to arbitration in 
accordance with the terms of the agreement.”23 These sections specify the 
action the court must take upon satisfaction that a controversy is, in fact, 
arbitrable. 
In short, section 1 sets forth the scope of the Act; section 2 validates 
arbitration agreements as legally binding; and sections 3 and 4 direct courts 
to abdicate their jurisdiction upon satisfaction that the underlying contract is 
valid, and that the dispute falls within the range of issues contemplated by 
the text of the agreement.  
While the Act clearly and unambiguously delineates Congress’s intent to 
place arbitration agreements on equal footing with all other contracts, it is 
not without limits. The Act’s boundaries are primarily shown through two 
distinct considerations. First, the FAA in itself does not create a basis for 
federal jurisdiction. A federal court must find some independent basis of 
jurisdiction before adjudicating a claim involving an arbitration dispute.
24
 
Second, the FAA is limited by section 1, which exempts from the FAA 
                                                                                                             
 19. 9 U.S.C. § 2. 
 20. H.R. REP. NO. 68-96, at 1 (1924). 
 21. 9 U.S.C. §§ 3, 4. 
 22. Id. § 3. 
 23. Id. § 4. 
 24. Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 15 n.9 (1984) (“While the Federal 
Arbitration Act creates federal substantive law requiring the parties to honor arbitration 
agreements, it does not create any independent federal-question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1331 (1976) or otherwise.”) (citing Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. 
Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 25 n.32 (1983)); Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp., 460 U.S. at 25 n.32 
(noting that the FAA requires “diversity of citizenship or some other independent basis for 
federal jurisdiction”). 
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol72/iss3/7
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“contracts of employment of transportation workers.”25 This Note focuses 
on the latter. 
B. The Court’s Treatment of Arbitrability Disputes 
Following the enactment of the FAA, United States federal courts refined 
their analysis and interpretation of disputes arising under contracts 
containing an agreement to arbitrate. Slowly but surely, courts began to 
uphold and enforce agreements to arbitrate. Over time, however, the 
judiciary’s willingness to scrutinize arbitration agreements prior to 
relinquishing jurisdiction to an arbitrator diminished to the point where 
courts’ interpretation of the FAA appeared to place arbitration agreements 
on a pedestal.
26
  
Two fundamental questions have arisen in modern arbitration 
jurisprudence. The first asks whether the dispute is “arbitrable.” This 
question turns on “whether the parties have agreed to submit a particular 
grievance to arbitration.”27 Should the adjudicator determine that the parties 
agreed to arbitrate a given dispute within the language of the contract, it is 
referred to an arbitral forum. If they did not, the dispute is decided in a 
court of law.  
The second question considers the procedure for determining the first by 
asking whether a court or an arbitrator should make the “merits” 
determination. While the outcome should conceivably be the same 
regardless of who makes the arbitrability determination, the procedural 
question of who decides may, in fact, be dispositive of the merits 
dispute
28—most simply because arbitrators possess a perverse incentive to 
determine a dispute’s arbitrability in a manner that allows them to retain 
jurisdiction.
29
 As such, the procedural question has been hotly disputed and 
                                                                                                             
 25. Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 119 (2001). 
 26. See Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp., 460 U.S. at 24–25 (noting the “liberal federal 
policy favoring arbitration” and establishing the principle that “any doubts concerning the 
scope of arbitrable issues should be resolved in favor of arbitration”). 
 27. AT&T Techs., Inc. v. Commc’ns Workers of Am., 475 U.S. 643, 649 (1986). 
 28. See First Options of Chi., Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 942 (1995) (“Hence, who—
court or arbitrator—has the primary authority to decide whether a party has agreed to 
arbitrate can make a critical difference to a party resisting arbitration.”).  
 29. See Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 416 (1967) 
(Black, J., dissenting) (“The only advantage of submitting the issue . . . to arbitration is for 
the arbitrators. Their compensation corresponds to the volume of arbitration they perform.”). 
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heavily litigated throughout the life of the Act,
30
 and a brief discussion of 
its historical treatment is warranted. 
From the enactment of the FAA until the late 2000s, the established 
principle regarding questions of arbitrability was that they were “an issue 
for judicial determination . . . . Unless the parties clearly and unmistakably 
provide otherwise.”31 The premise during this period was to give effect to 
the parties’ intent by first answering the question of “who has the primary 
power to decide arbitrability” by determining “what the parties agreed 
about that matter.”32 Nonetheless, Congress originally reserved two issues 
for the judiciary’s exclusive determination: (1) whether a given arbitration 
clause bound the parties to a dispute and (2) whether a binding arbitration 
clause applied to a particular type of controversy.
33
 In 2010, however, the 
Supreme Court announced that parties had the right to have arbitrators 
determine all questions of arbitrability should they so choose, by declaring 
that “parties can agree to arbitrate ‘gateway’ questions of ‘arbitrability,’ 
such as whether the parties have agreed to arbitrate or whether their 
agreement covers a particular controversy.”34  
Today, because the Court broadly granted authority to arbitrators, cases 
based on a contract containing an agreement to arbitrate are routinely 
stayed and arbitration is compelled pending the arbitrator’s decision of its 
own jurisdiction to decide the matter. Therein lies the fundamental issue 
that has given rise to copious litigation in the twenty-first century: whether 
an arbitrator should have the authority to determine its own—and, in turn, 
the courts’—jurisdiction under the FAA.35 The Court’s decision to abdicate 
responsibility for deciding its own jurisdiction has effectively extirpated the 
right of those on the wrong end of a contract containing an arbitration 
agreement to be heard by a court of law. 
  
                                                                                                             
 30. See, e.g., Rent-A-Ctr., W., Inc. v. Jackson, 561 U.S. 63, 67–70 (2010); Howsam v. 
Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 537 U.S. 79, 84 (2002); First Options, 514 U.S. at 943–44. 
 31. AT&T Techs., 475 U.S. at 649; see also First Options, 514 U.S. at 943 (“Just as the 
arbitrability of the merits of a dispute depends on whether the parties agreed to arbitrate that 
dispute, so the question ‘who has the primary power to decide arbitrability’ turns upon what 
the parties agreed about that matter.”) (citations omitted). 
 32. First Options, 514 U.S. at 943. 
 33. See Howsam, 537 U.S. at 84. 
 34. Rent-A-Ctr., 561 U.S. at 68–69. 
 35. For where the arbitrator determines they properly have jurisdiction to resolve a 
dispute, they necessarily subjugate the court’s jurisdiction over the same. See 9 U.S.C. §§ 3, 
4. 
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C. The Circuit Split—Who Should Determine the Question of Arbitrability 
When determining issues of arbitrability, the United States Supreme 
Court has routinely held that where a valid arbitration agreement exists and 
the parties have delegated issues of arbitrability to an arbitrator, a court 
should stay an action and compel arbitration.
36
 The Court has not, however, 
answered the question of who—an arbitrator or a court—should determine 
whether a disputed contract falls within the section 1 exemption of the 
FAA. The Court similarly has not determined whether the form or the 
substance of a contractual relationship is the guiding principle behind 
determining whether the contract is exempted from the FAA’s coverage. 
Prior to New Prime, two circuits addressed the issue and decidedly split, 
reaching different conclusions as to the ability of an arbitrator to determine 
the court’s jurisdiction. 
1. Arbitrators Should Determine the Applicability of the Section 1 
Exemption: Green v. SuperShuttle International, Inc.  
On one side of the split, the Eighth Circuit found that arbitrators could 
decide the applicability of the section 1 exemption in a case considering a 
contract between a busing corporation and a driver-franchisee. In Green v. 
SuperShuttle International, Inc., a bus driver brought suit on behalf of 
himself and other similarly situated individuals who had entered into Unit 
Franchise Agreements (“UFAs”) with a shared-ride shuttle service, alleging 
violations of state labor laws.
37
 The defendant owned and operated a shuttle 
service in which it classified its shuttle bus drivers as franchisees, as 
opposed to employees, and required them to sign UFAs that contained an 
arbitration agreement binding both parties to arbitrate any controversy 
arising out of the UFA.
38
 
The shuttle service removed the action to federal court and moved to 
compel arbitration against the drivers.
39
 After finding that “it did not need 
to decide whether [the] Section 1” exemption applied to the UFAs, the 
district court granted the defendant’s motion to compel arbitration and 
dismissed the action.
40
 Petitioner appealed, claiming the district court erred 
in granting the motion.
41
 The bus driver argued that “the district court 
lacked subject matter jurisdiction to compel arbitration” under section 4 of 
                                                                                                             
 36. See supra Section II.B. 
 37. 653 F.3d 766, 767 (8th Cir. 2011). 
 38. Id. at 767–68. 
 39. Id. at 768. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. 
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the FAA because the UFAs were not subject to the FAA due to section 1’s 
exemption.
42
  
The Eighth Circuit rejected this argument in a succinct opinion, holding 
that because “the UFAs specifically incorporated the Rules of the American 
Arbitration Association (AAA),” the “arbitrator has the power to determine 
his or her own jurisdiction over a controversy between the parties.”43 
Further, the driver “agreed to have the arbitrator decide whether the” 
section 1 exemption applied to the UFA.
44
 As was to be expected in light of 
the misplaced favoritism toward compelling arbitration when there is any 
semblance of a valid arbitration agreement, the Eighth Circuit surrendered 
its own jurisdiction in favor of allowing an arbitrator to handle the 
dispute.
45
 
2. The Judiciary Should Determine the Applicability of the Section 1 
Exemption: In re Van Dusen 
On the other side of the split, the Ninth Circuit answered the question of 
whether an arbitrator should decide the applicability of the section 1 
exemption in the negative. 
In In re Van Dusen, two interstate truck drivers who had previously 
entered into Independent Contractor Operating Agreements (“ICOAs”) with 
a transportation company, brought a class action against the company 
alleging various violations of state and federal labor laws.
46
 The defendant 
transportation company “moved to compel arbitration pursuant to 
arbitration clauses contained in the ICOAs,”47 and petitioners opposed, 
arguing “that the ICOAs were exempt from arbitration under Section 1 of 
the FAA.”48 After finding that the ICOAs contained valid arbitration 
clauses, “the District Court declined to rule on the applicability of the 
exemption” to the present case, “holding that the question of whether an 
employer/employee relationship existed between the parties was a question 
for the arbitrator to decide in the first instance.”49 The petitioners then 
                                                                                                             
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. at 769. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. at 770. 
 46. 654 F.3d 838, 840 (9th Cir. 2011). 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. 
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moved for certification of an interlocutory appeal and, upon denial, sought 
mandamus relief before the Ninth Circuit.
50
 
The defendant argued that whether a contract was exempted by the FAA 
is a “question of arbitrability,” and thus subject to determination by the 
arbitrator.
51
 Petitioners advanced a novel argument, framing the question of 
section 1’s applicability as an “antecedent determination.”52 Under this 
theory, a court must first determine that a contract is, in fact, arbitrable 
under section 1 of the FAA before it has jurisdiction to stay the action and 
compel arbitration pursuant to sections 3 and 4 of the Act.
53
  
Although the Ninth Circuit ultimately refused to extend mandamus relief 
because mandamus relief is only available upon a showing of clear error by 
the lower court,
54
 they did so only after stating unequivocally that “the best 
reading of the law requires the district court to assess whether a section 1 
exemption applies before ordering arbitration.”55 
Citing Supreme Court precedent, the Ninth Circuit began with a textual 
analysis of the FAA and found that the issue before it was not a “question 
of arbitrability,” which would be sent to the arbitrator to decide,56 but rather 
an “antecedent agreement [that] the party seeking arbitration asks the 
federal court to enforce.”57 The Ninth Circuit reasoned “that a district court 
has no authority to compel arbitration under Section 4 where Section 1 
exempts the underlying contract from the FAA’s provisions.”58 The Van 
Dusen Court averred that holding otherwise “puts the cart before the horse” 
                                                                                                             
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. at 843. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. at 846; see also Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Court for D.C., 542 U.S. 367, 380 (2004) 
(“[O]nly exceptional circumstances amounting to a ‘judicial usurpation of power,’ or a ‘clear 
abuse of discretion,’ will justify the invocation of this extraordinary remedy.”) (internal 
citations omitted) (quoting Will v. United States, 389 U.S. 90, 95 (1967); Bankers Life & 
Cas. Co. v. Holland, 346 U.S. 379, 383 (1953)); Ex parte Fahey, 332 U.S. 258, 259–60 
(1947) (noting the writ of mandamus is a “drastic and extraordinary” remedy “reserved for 
really extraordinary causes”). 
 55. Van Dusen, 654 F.3d at 846.  
 56. Id. at 845. The Van Dusen Court looked to Supreme Court precedent in upholding 
the proposition that “the law clearly permits parties to delegate ‘questions of arbitrability’ to 
an arbitrator.” Id. at 844 (citing AT&T Techs., Inc. v. Comm’ns Workers of Am., 475 U.S. 
643, 649 (1986)). The court then used the Supreme Court’s definition of “questions of 
arbitrability” as questions of “whether the parties have submitted a particular dispute to 
arbitration.” Id. (quoting Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 537 U.S. 79, 83 (2002)). 
 57. Id. at 845 (quoting Rent-A-Ctr., W., Inc. v. Jackson, 561 U.S. 63, 69 (2010)). 
 58. Id. at 843. 
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and that “private contracting parties cannot, through the insertion of a 
delegation clause, confer authority upon a district court that Congress chose 
to withhold.”59  
For seemingly the first time in the twenty-first century, a federal circuit 
court was willing to analyze, in-depth, the text of the FAA prior to 
compelling arbitration. The Ninth Circuit diverged from the status-quo by 
holding that it is for the federal courts, and not arbitrators, to interpret 
federal statutes and determine whether a court has appropriate jurisdiction 
before applying federal law to the matter presently before it. The 
divergence of the circuits and the prevalence of arbitration provisions 
necessitated a clear resolution to the question of which adjudicator is bound 
to resolve antecedent determinations of compliance with the FAA 
exemptions. In Oliveira v. New Prime, the Supreme Court sought to do just 
that.  
III. Statement of the Case 
A. Facts 
New Prime, Inc. (“Prime”) “operates an interstate trucking company.”60 
As part of its business model, Prime recruits and trains new drivers under 
its Student Truck Driver Program (the “Program”).61 Under the Program, 
recruits are required to attend a four-day orientation; “log 10,000 miles as a 
driver or passenger” with an established Prime truck driver; pass an 
examination to obtain a Commercial Driver’s License; log “30,000 more 
miles as a B2” trainee; and, finally, attend one week of additional 
orientation classes.
62
 Students are compensated at the rate “of $200 per 
week for food[, ]which . . . must be repaid[]” upon completion, and 
“fourteen cents per mile” for the 30,000 miles logged as a B2 trainee.63 
Prime charges tuition for the Program; however, Prime forgives this debt 
for drivers who remain with the company for one year following successful 
completion of the Program.
64
 
Upon completion, new drivers are given a choice between entering into 
either an employer-employee or independent contractor relationship with 
                                                                                                             
 59. Id. at 844. 
 60. Oliveira v. New Prime, Inc., 857 F.3d 7, 9 (1st Cir. 2017), affirmed, 139 S. Ct. 532 
(2019). 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. 
 64. See id. at 10. 
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Prime.
65
 By offering a $100 bonus, informing new drivers that they will 
make more money as contractors, and providing streamlined access to 
accounting and leasing services, Prime spurs drivers to serve as 
independent contractors.
66
  
Plaintiff, Dominic Oliveira, graduated from Prime’s Program.67 Over the 
course of the Program, Oliveira was paid according to Prime’s standard 
compensation protocol.
68
 Prime, however, reduced Oliveira’s per-mile pay 
during his time as a B2 trainee to recover the $200 per week that it paid him 
for food and other expenses.
69
 After successfully completing the Program 
and being promised, among other things, higher pay and the freedom to set 
his hours and haul freight for any company he pleased, Oliveira elected to 
enter into an independent contractor relationship with Prime.
70
 Oliveira was 
assisted by firms that Prime recommended in forming a limited liability 
company, leasing a truck, and purchasing fuel—all things he would need to 
complete before he would be allowed to haul freight for Prime.
71
 Oliveira 
then signed an Independent Contractor Operating Agreement (“ICOA”), 
officially entered into a working relationship with Prime, and began hauling 
freight.
72
  
The ICOA contained the following conditions: (1) the specification that 
the relationship between Prime and Oliveira was one “of carrier and 
independent contractor and not an employer/employee relationship;” (2) a 
provision allowing Oliveira “to provide transportation services to 
companies besides Prime;” (3) a provision providing that Oliveira would be 
able to “refuse to haul any load offered by Prime[] and determine his own 
driving times and delivery routes;” (4) an obligation for Oliveira to pay all 
expenses associated with and “incurred in connection with his use of the 
truck leased” to him; and (5) an arbitration clause which obligated the 
parties “to arbitrate ‘any disputes arising under, arising out of or relating 
to’” the ICOA.73  
Shortly after Oliveira entered into the working relationship, the wheels 
fell off. Almost immediately, Prime began significantly controlling 
                                                                                                             
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. at 9. 
 68. Id. at 9–10. 
 69. Id. at 10. 
 70. See id. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. (quoting language from provisions of the contract). 
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Oliveira’s work by requiring him to transport its shipments, complete 
company training, and abide by all company rules and procedures.
74
 
Oliveira was unable to set his hours, refuse Prime shipments, or haul freight 
for any other transportation company.
75
 Further, Oliveira was underpaid for 
the jobs he was required to take.
76
 Tired of being overworked and under-
compensated, he “stopped driving for Prime” altogether.77 Less than a 
month later, however, Oliveira entered into a new working relationship with 
Prime—this time as an employee.78 Following his rehire, Oliveira’s job 
responsibilities were “‘substantially identical’ to those he had as an 
independent contractor.”79 
B. Issue 
Oliveira filed a class action suit against Prime, alleging violations of 
federal and state labor laws.
80
 “Prime moved to compel arbitration,” 
asserting that because Oliveira had elected to enter into an independent 
contractor relationship with Prime, as opposed to an employee-employer 
relationship, he was not exempted from arbitration under section 1 of the 
FAA.
81
 Oliveira countered, asserting “that the motion to compel arbitration 
should be denied” for two reasons: (1) because the contract as a whole was 
exempted from the FAA under section 1; and (2) because the question of 
whether his ICOA was exempted under section 1 was for the court to 
decide, not an arbitrator.
82
 
The district court denied Prime’s motion to compel, holding that the 
court should decide the applicability of the section 1 exemption and 
determining that it could not answer the question of whether the exemption 
applied in this case until after the parties conducted further discovery on 
Oliveira’s employment status.83 Prime moved for interlocutory appeal of 
the district court’s ruling, and the First Circuit granted review of two 
distinct issues raised below: (1) whether a dispute over the applicability of 
the section 1 exemption must be resolved by an arbitrator or by a court and 
                                                                                                             
 74. Id. at 11. 
 75. Id.  
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id.  
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. at 11–12. 
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(2) whether the section 1 exemption encompasses independent contractor 
agreements.
84
  
C. Decision Below 
The First Circuit began its analysis of the first issue by considering out-
of-circuit precedent cited by each party.
85
 New Prime championed the 
Eighth Circuit’s holding in Green v. SuperShuttle International, Inc. to 
argue that the question of section 1’s applicability is an “issue of 
arbitrability” and thus one for an arbitrator.86 Oliveira, however, cited the 
Ninth Circuit’s holding in In re Van Dusen to support the contention that 
the applicability question did not fit squarely within “questions of 
arbitrability” and was therefore an “antecedent determination” for the court 
to decide.
87
  
The court dismissed Green’s premise by framing the present issue as an 
“antecedent determination” and stating that “[w]here . . . the parties dispute 
whether the district court has the authority to compel arbitration under the 
FAA, the extent of the arbitrator’s jurisdiction is of no concern.”88 The First 
Circuit reasoned that the holding in Green was illogical because it would 
require a federal court to act under section 4 of the FAA—at the direction 
of two private contracting parties—even though Congress plainly and 
unambiguously withheld that exact authority from the courts in section 1.
89
 
The First Circuit adopted the reasoning of the Ninth Circuit, deciding 
that “the question of the court’s authority to act under the FAA is an 
‘antecedent determination’ for the district court to make before it can 
compel arbitration under the Act.”90 Ultimately, the court held that 
“[n]othing . . . purports to allow the arbitrator to decide whether a federal 
district court has the authority to act under a federal statute” when Congress 
has expressly withheld that authority.
91
 This finding allowed the First 
Circuit to decide the second issue on appeal: whether the section 1 
exemption applies to all agreements to do work or solely to “contracts of 
employment.” 
                                                                                                             
 84. Id. at 9. 
 85. Id. at 12–14. 
 86. Id. at 12–13. 
 87. Id. at 14. 
 88. Id. at 15. 
 89. See id. (“[P]rivate contracting parties cannot, through the insertion of a delegation 
clause, confer authority upon a district court . . . that Congress chose to withhold.”) (quoting 
In re Van Dusen, 654 F.3d 838, 844 (9th Cir. 2011)). 
 90. Id. at 14 (citing Van Dusen, 654 F.3d at 843). 
 91. Id. at 15 (footnote omitted).  
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According to the First Circuit, the applicability issue turned on whether 
the agreement between Oliveira and New Prime, which “establish[ed] or 
purport[ed] to establish an independent-contractor relationship,” fell within 
the statutory language of “contracts of employment.”92 Prime argued that, 
in light of a federal policy favoring arbitration, the court was compelled to 
find that the exemption should be narrowly applied only to those contracts 
which, on their face, give rise to an employer-employee relationship.
93
 
Oliveira disagreed, arguing that the section 1 exemption covers all 
agreements to do work, regardless of one’s classification as an employee or 
independent contractor.
94
 
In responding to Prime’s contention that federal policy favoring 
arbitration compelled the court’s decision, the First Circuit answered that 
policy, no matter how strong or at what judicial level, cannot override the 
meaning of the plain text of the statute.
95
 The First Circuit began by 
analyzing the ordinary meaning of “contracts of employment” in light of 
dictionaries and secondary sources from the time of the enactment of the 
FAA.
96
 The court concluded that the “ordinary meaning of the phrase” and 
“Prime’s concession that Oliveira is a transportation worker” allowed for 
only one finding: that Oliveira’s independent contractor agreement with 
Prime fell squarely within the section 1 exemption.
97
 Moreover, the court 
noted that its holding here—that “contracts of employment” means 
“agreements to perform work and includes independent-contractor 
agreements”—aligned with “Congress’s demonstrated concern with 
transportation workers and their necessary role in the free flow of goods.”98 
D. Supreme Court Decision 
1. Issue (1): Who Decides Whether the Section 1 Exemption Applies? 
Prime timely filed a petition for writ of certiorari and the Supreme Court 
granted the same for the 2018–2019 term.99 The Supreme Court initiated its 
analysis of the procedural issue by recognizing that “[w]hile a court’s 
authority under the Arbitration Act to compel arbitration may be 
                                                                                                             
 92. Id. at 16. 
 93. Id. at 10, 25. 
 94. Id. at 20. 
 95. Id. at 20–21. 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. at 22. 
 98. Id. at 23 (quoting Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 121 (2001)). 
 99. New Prime Inc. v. Oliveira, 138 S. Ct. 1164 (mem.) (2018). 
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considerable, it isn’t unconditional.”100 The Court reasoned that “no matter 
how emphatically they may express a preference for arbitration,” private 
contracting parties cannot bestow upon a court the authority to stay 
litigation and compel arbitration where the Act has expressly withheld as 
much.
101
  
Delving into the text of the Act, the Court noted the importance of the 
statute’s sequencing, citing precedent for the proposition that the first four 
sections of the Act “are integral parts of a whole.”102 Here, the Court 
emphasized that enforceability under sections 3 and 4 depends on whether 
those provisions are part of a contract covered by sections 1 and 2, which 
“define the field in which Congress was legislating.”103 The Court 
concluded that a court may only use sections 3 and 4 to enforce an 
agreement to arbitrate “if the clause appears in a ‘written provision in . . . a 
contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce’ consistent with 
[section] 2. And only if the contract . . . doesn’t trigger [section] 1’s 
‘contracts of employment’ exemption.”104 Agreeing with the First Circuit, 
the Court held “that a court should decide for itself whether [section] 1’s 
‘contracts of employment’ exclusion applies before ordering arbitration.”105  
The Court then turned to Prime’s contention that the combination of a 
delegation clause
106
 and the severability principle
107
 can serve as alternative 
authority for sending parties to an arbitral forum nonetheless. Under this 
theory, because Oliveira did not specifically challenge the delegation clause 
and instead challenged the contract as a whole, Prime argued “that any 
controversy should . . . proceed . . . before an arbitrator.”108 The Court 
quickly dismissed this contention as “overlook[ing] the necessarily 
                                                                                                             
 100. New Prime Inc. v. Oliveira, 139 S. Ct. 532, 537 (2019). 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. at 538 (quoting Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of Am., 350 U.S. 198, 201–02 
(1956)). 
 103. Id. (quoting Bernhardt, 350 U.S. at 201–02). 
 104. Id. (quoting 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2018)). 
 105. Id. at 537. 
 106. “A delegation clause gives an arbitrator authority to decide even the initial question 
whether the parties’ dispute is subject to arbitration.” Id. at 538 (citing Rent-A-Ctr., W., Inc. 
v. Jackson, 561 U.S. 63, 68–69 (2010)). 
 107. “[U]nder the severability principle, we treat a challenge to the validity of an 
arbitration agreement (or a delegation clause) separately from a challenge to the validity of 
the entire contract in which it appears.” Id. (citing Rent-A-Ctr., 561 U.S. at 70–71). “Unless 
a party specifically challenges the validity of the agreement to arbitrate, both sides may be 
required to take all their disputes . . . to arbitration.” Id. (citing Rent-A-Ctr., 561 U.S. at 70–
71). 
 108. Id. 
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antecedent statutory inquiry.”109 The Court reiterated that “[a] delegation 
clause is merely a specialized type of arbitration agreement, and the Act 
‘operates’” upon it in the same way as it does any other arbitration 
agreement.
110
  
2. Issue (2): Whether the Section 1 Exemption Applies to Independent 
Contractors 
After reciting the age-old adage “that words generally should be 
interpreted as taking their ordinary . . . meaning . . . at the time Congress 
enacted the statute,”111 the Court began resolving the merits issue by 
analyzing the text of the Act and succinctly identifying the issue before it 
as: What did the term “contracts of employment” mean at the time of 
enactment?
112
  
The Court noted that while the term “contracts of employment” today 
signals the relationship arising from the law of agency between master and 
servant, at the time of adoption, the phrase “usually meant nothing more 
than agreement to perform work.”113 To support this contention, the Court 
pointed to the fact that the term “contract of employment” was not defined 
in any of the popular or legal dictionaries at the time of the FAA’s 
enactment.
114
 The Court reasoned this lack of coverage signified that the 
phrase was not a term of art carrying a specialized meaning; therefore, it 
should be interpreted simply by analyzing the meaning of each word.
115
  
The merits dispute was thus decided based on the meaning of the word 
“employment.”116 The Court found that dictionaries of the enactment era 
tended to treat “employment” as a synonym for “work” and did not 
“distinguish between different kinds of work or workers.”117 Moreover, the 
Court noted that its cases, as well as state court cases and federal and state 
statutes, commonly used the phrase to describe the relationship of 
independent contractor and principal.
118
 The Court found greater support for 
the notion that “employment” includes independent contractor relationships 
                                                                                                             
 109. Id. 
 110. Id. (quoting Rent-A-Ctr., 561 U.S. at 70). 
 111. Id. at 539 (internal citations omitted) (quoting Wis. Cent. Ltd. v. United States, 138 
S. Ct. 2067, 2074 (2018)). 
 112. Id. at 539–44. 
 113. Id. at 539. 
 114. Id. 
 115. See id. at 539–40. 
 116. See id. at 539–41. 
 117. Id. at 539–40. 
 118. Id. at 540. 
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when analyzing the text surrounding the phrase.
119
 In drafting section 1’s 
language, Congress refrained from using the word “employees” or 
“servants” and instead spoke of “workers.”120 This choice, explained the 
Court, “easily embraces independent contractors.”121 
Noting Prime’s inability to explain away the plain meaning of the phrase 
at the time of enactment, the Court then considered Prime’s policy 
argument that federal policy favoring arbitration compelled the Court to 
send the case to an arbitral forum.
122
 Without negating this contention, the 
Court reasoned that it must nonetheless “‘respect the limits up to which 
Congress was prepared’ to go when adopting the Arbitration Act.”123 The 
Court held that the plain text of the Act, coupled with the judiciary’s 
inability to override the boundaries set by Congress, could only lead to one 
conclusion: the section 1 exemption encompasses all agreements to do 
work—even those that purport to, or in fact do, establish an independent 
contractor-principal relationship.
124
 
IV. Getting the FAA Back on the Road 
Through legal doctrine and failure to independently interpret federal 
statutes, courts have historically allowed businesses to draft contractual 
agreements for workers in such a manner that abolishes the ability of those 
who perform services from seeking redress for violations of law and for 
breach of contract in a judicial forum. New Prime radically departs from the 
status quo and brings arbitration jurisprudence back in accord with the 
purpose for which the Federal Arbitration Act was enacted.  
A. Issue (1): Who Should Determine Issues of “Antecedent Determination” 
Such as the Applicability of the Section 1 Exemption of the FAA 
In 1803, Chief Justice John Marshall declared, “It is emphatically the 
province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.”125 
Because a different interpretation of the FAA threatened to severely 
diminish the due process rights of the parties
126
 and ultimately dispose of 
                                                                                                             
 119. See id. at 540–41. 
 120. Id. at 541. 
 121. Id. 
 122. Id. at 543. 
 123. Id. (quoting United States v. Sisson, 399 U.S. 267, 298 (1970)). 
 124. See id. at 542–44. 
 125. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803). 
 126. See Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 407 (1967) 
(Black, J., dissenting) (“I am by no means sure that thus forcing a person to forgo his 
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some controversies altogether,
127
 the Court in New Prime appropriately 
reserved the power to determine the scope of the Act’s application for the 
judiciary. From a policy perspective, arbitrators are ill-equipped and 
inappropriately incentivized to determine the applicability of the section 1 
exemption. Furthermore, under the language of the Act, arbitrators have no 
right to subjugate the federal courts’ jurisdiction. Instead, Congress granted 
that power to the judiciary. 
Although the Court declined to discuss its policy reasoning when 
deciding the procedural question, its holding is supported by a logical 
policy argument that the judiciary should resolve questions concerning the 
applicability of the Act. While today’s arbitrators are often highly skilled 
and knowledgeable adjudicators, they serve as no real substitute for the 
federal courts in their ability to determine the applicability of federal 
statutes.  
Three concerns arise from the prospect of allowing arbitrators to 
determine the applicability of the section 1 exemption. First, under the rules 
of the American Arbitration Association, arbitrators are not required to 
have ever practiced law.
128
 Second, as noted by Justice Black in his Prima 
Paint Corporation v. Flood & Conklin Manufacturing Co. dissent, 
arbitrators “even if qualified to apply the law, [are] not bound to do so.”129 
Third, arbitrators are wholly incentivized to resolve matters in a manner 
that keeps them within the arbitrator’s jurisdiction.130  
When the judiciary decides the applicability of the Act, however, these 
three concerns become moot. The judiciary is comprised solely of attorneys 
well versed in law, duty-bound to apply it, and lacking any incentive to 
usurp judicial authority. Further, as noted by Justice Black, “a reasonable 
                                                                                                             
opportunity to try his legal issues in the courts where, unlike the situation in arbitration, he 
may have a jury trial and right to appeal, is not a denial of due process of law.”). 
 127. See First Options of Chi., Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 942 (1995) (“Hence, who—
court or arbitrator—has the primary authority to decide whether a party has agreed to 
arbitrate can make a critical difference to a party resisting arbitration.”). 
 128. Qualification Criteria for Admittance to the AAA National Roster of Arbitrators, 
AM. ARBITRATION ASS’N, http://www.adr.org/sites/default/files/document_repository/ 
Qualification_Criteria_for_Admittance_to_the_AAA_National_Roster_of_Arbitrators.pdf 
(last visited Oct. 14, 2019) (noting that applicants for membership must meet or exceed the 
requirement of a “[m]inimum of 10 years of senior-level business or professional experience 
or legal practice”). 
 129. Prima Paint Corp., 388 U.S. at 407 (Black, J., dissenting). 
 130. See id. at 416 (Black, J., dissenting) (“The only advantage of submitting the 
issue . . . to arbitration is for the arbitrators. Their compensation corresponds to the volume 
of arbitration they perform.”). 
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and fair reading of [the] Act’s language and history” demonstrates 
Congress’s intent not to “trespass upon the courts’ prerogative to decide the 
legal question of whether any legal contract exists upon which to base 
arbitration.”131 Therefore, from a policy standpoint, arbitration “is not a 
proper remedy for . . . questions with which the arbitrators have no 
particular experience and which are better left to the determination of 
skilled judges with a background of legal experience and established 
systems of law.”132 
An analysis of the text of the Act itself and the Supreme Court’s 
precedential treatment of its sequencing reveals a similar conclusion. While 
after the Court’s decision in Rent-A-Center parties may contractually 
designate an arbitrator to determine questions of arbitrability, “a court’s 
authority under the Arbitration Act to compel arbitration . . . isn’t 
unconditional”133 and is bound by the limits set by Congress in sections 1 
and 2. The Court has, at least since 1956, stressed the significance of the 
Act’s sequencing and recognized that each of the Act’s sections are 
“integral parts of a whole.”134 Further, the Court has found that sections 1 
and 2 “define the field in which Congress was legislating,” and that sections 
3 and 4 only apply to contracts within that field.
135
 The Court has also 
recognized that “the enforceability of arbitration provisions” (i.e., sections 3 
and 4) “depends on whether those provisions are ‘part of . . . a contract 
“evidencing a transaction involving commerce”’” under section 2.136 
Following this line of reasoning, and understanding that section 1 helps 
define the types of contracts contemplated by section 2,
137
 there is only one 
conclusion—courts may not stay proceedings properly before them and 
compel arbitration under section 4 prior to determining their own 
jurisdiction under sections 1 and 2. 
Consistent with both policy and text, the Court in New Prime took a 
momentous step towards restoring the due process rights of those 
individuals who are parties to a contract that one party claims should fall 
                                                                                                             
 131. Id. at 407–08 (Black, J., dissenting). 
 132. Id. at 415–16 n.15 (Black, J., dissenting) (quoting Julius Henry Cohen & Kenneth 
Dayton, The New Federal Arbitration Law, 12 VA. L. REV. 265, 281 (1926)). 
 133. New Prime Inc. v. Oliveira, 139 S. Ct. 532, 537 (2019). 
 134. Id. at 538 (quoting Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of Am., 350 U.S. 198, 201–02 
(1956)). 
 135. Id. (quoting Bernhardt, 350 U.S. at 201). 
 136. Id. (quoting Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 10–11 (1984)). 
 137. See id. at 537 (“§ 1 helps define § 2’s terms.”). 
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within the FAA’s coverage. The New Prime Court rightly held that it is for 
the judiciary to analyze and adjudicate federal statutes.  
B. Issue (2): Whether the Section 1 Exemption Applies to Independent 
Contractors 
Section 1 of the FAA sets forth the premise that “nothing” within the Act 
shall apply to “contracts of employment of . . . any . . . class of workers 
engaged in foreign or interstate commerce.”138 Despite this seemingly broad 
and straight-forward language, the statute has, for decades, been misapplied 
in a nefariously underinclusive manner.
139
 Historically, corporations have 
been able to skirt the Act’s section 1 exemption to mandatory arbitration by 
simply classifying those who carry out their day-to-day revenue-generating 
activities as “independent contractors” as opposed to “employees,” 
regardless of whether there exists any substantial difference in the everyday 
functions of such individuals.  
This dichotomous, form-over-function approach has plagued many 
potentially meritorious actions brought by plaintiffs against the company 
with which they have contracted to perform services by sending them to 
arbitral forums that often lack procedural and evidentiary safeguards. 
Despite the broad language of the Act, which seems to cover all “workers,” 
courts have refused to include contracts that purport to establish an 
independent contractor agreement within the language of section 1’s 
exemption. Courts have primarily offered two justifications as to why the 
section 1 exemption does not cover independent contractor agreements: (1) 
the liberal federal policy favoring arbitral dispute resolution and (2) the 
Supreme Court’s instruction to narrowly construe the section 1 
exemption.
140
 
                                                                                                             
 138. 9 U.S.C. § 1 (2018). 
 139. See, e.g., Lenz v. Yellow Transp., Inc., 431 F.3d 348 (8th Cir. 2005) (enforcing an 
arbitration agreement for a customer service representative for an interstate trucking 
company); Palcko v. Airborne Express, Inc., 372 F.3d 588 (3d Cir. 2004) (enforcing an 
arbitration agreement under state law despite determining that the employee in question was 
engaged in interstate commerce).  
 140. See, e.g., Villalpando v. Transguard Ins. Co. of Am., 17 F. Supp. 3d 969, 982 (N.D. 
Cal. 2014) (“[C]onsidering that the § 1 exclusion is to be both interpreted narrowly and 
understood to favor arbitration the Court declines to find at this time that Plaintiff is exempt 
from the FAA.”) (citations omitted); Owner-Operator Indep. Drivers Ass’n v. Swift Transp. 
Co., 288 F. Supp. 2d 1033, 1035–36 (D. Ariz. 2003) (“Given the strong and liberal federal 
policy favoring arbitral dispute resolution, the Court cannot conclude on this record that § 1 
bars the enforcement of the arbitration provision at issue.”); Morning Star Assocs., Inc. v. 
Unishippers Glob. Logistics, LLC, No. CV 115-033, 2015 WL 2408477, at *4–5 (S.D. Ga. 
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Nonetheless, the New Prime Court grabbed the wheel and veered back 
onto the road Congress intended. New Prime used a textualist analysis to 
close the form over function loophole in the simplest way possible—not by 
distinguishing between an “employee” and “independent contractor,” but 
by instead concluding that both fall within the scope of the exemption. 
Although it ultimately refused to offer an analysis of as much, New Prime is 
consistent with both the legislative history behind the Act and the Court’s 
precedential treatment of the language of the section 1 exemption. 
The legislative history of the Act, though sparse, is demonstrative of 
Congress’s intent behind its enactment. Congress adopted the FAA to 
compel federal courts to enforce arbitration agreements, during a time of 
undue hostility toward arbitration, by placing agreements to arbitrate 
disputes “upon the same footing as other contracts, where [they] 
belong[].”141 Originally proposed by trade associations dealing in groceries 
and other perishables and from commercial and mercantile groups,
142
 the 
Act was designed to guarantee certain procedural advantages at a time 
when there was “much agitation against the costliness and delays of 
litigation.”143 While the benefits of expediting dispute resolution for 
produced, shipped, bought, or sold commodities were obvious, the 
potentially overbroad scope of the Act created significant concerns.  
As the Court noted, Congress plainly “demonstrated concern with 
transportation workers and their necessary role in the free flow of goods.”144 
The main opposition to the Act came from members of organized labor 
organizations who noted “the potential disparity in bargaining power 
between individual employees and large employers.”145 These organizations 
were concerned with the potential the Act had to “require courts to enforce 
unfair employment contracts,”146 especially “insurance, employment, 
construction, and shipping contracts . . . routinely . . . being offered on a 
take-it-or-leave-it basis to captive customers or employees.”147  
                                                                                                             
May 20, 2015); Owner-Operator Indep. Drivers Ass’n v. United Van Lines, LLC, No. 
4:06CV219 JCH, 2006 WL 5003366, at *2 (E.D. Mo. Nov. 15, 2006). 
 141. H.R. REP. NO. 68-96, at 1 (1924). 
 142. Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 410 n.2 (1967) 
(Black, J., dissenting) (citing 50 A.B.A. REP. 357 (1925)). 
 143. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 360 (2011) (Breyer, J., 
dissenting) (citing H.R. REP. NO. 68-96, at 2 (1924)). 
 144. Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 121 (2001). 
 145. Id. at 132 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 146. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 147. Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 414 (1967) (Black, 
J., dissenting). 
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Labor disputes, however, were never designed to be within the scope of 
the Act. In fact, the chairman of the ABA committee that drafted the 
legislation stated at a Senate Judiciary Subcommittee hearing that “[i]t is 
not intended that this shall be an act referring to labor disputes, at all.”148 
The chairman further noted that should the Subcommittee fear any danger 
of labor disputes coming within the purview of the Act, they should add the 
language of “but nothing herein contained shall apply to seamen or any 
class of workers in interstate and foreign commerce” to clarify the point.149 
As such, when Congress drafted the final version of the Act, it had 
essentially adopted that exact language.
150
 The logical connection between 
the chairman’s words and Congress’s actions point only to the conclusion 
that Congress did not mean to include within the scope of the Act any labor 
disputes between parties engaged in the production, shipment, purchase, or 
sale of commodities, regardless of their relationship. 
Moreover, the decision in New Prime, while being a radical departure 
from the status quo of lower courts, is nonetheless consistent with the 
Court’s precedential treatment of the section 1 exemption. The Court has 
held that “the exclusion provision is limited to transportation workers, 
defined, for instance, as those workers ‘actually engaged in the movement 
of goods in interstate commerce.’”151 Further, the Court has held that “[i]t 
would be rational for Congress to ensure that workers in general would be 
covered by the provisions of the FAA, while reserving for itself more 
specific legislation for those engaged in transportation.”152 Knowing the 
importance of careful word choice, had the Court intended that the section 1 
exemption apply only to employees, it would have used that term in 
describing the scope.
153
  
By reasoning that the text of the FAA, as it was understood at the time of 
drafting, indicates that independent contractor-principal relationships 
should be included in the plain meaning of the term “contracts of 
employment,” the New Prime Court rightly decided the merits issue and 
                                                                                                             
 148. Sales and Contracts to Sell in Interstate and Foreign Commerce, and Federal 
Commercial Arbitration: Hearing on S. 4213 and S. 4214 Before a Subcomm. of the S. 
Comm. on the Judiciary, 67th Cong. 9 (1923) (statement of W.H.H. Platt, Chairman of the 
Committee of Commerce, Trade and Commercial Law of the American Bar Association). 
 149. Id. 
 150. See 9 U.S.C. § 1 (2018). 
 151. Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 112 (2001) (citing Cole v. Burns 
Int’l Sec. Servs., 105 F.3d 1465, 1471 (D.C. Cir. 1997)) (emphasis added). 
 152. Id. at 121 (emphasis added). 
 153. See New Prime Inc. v. Oliveira, 139 S. Ct. 532, 542 (2019) (“But if the parties’ 
extended etymological debate persuades us of anything, it is that care is called for.”). 
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brought arbitration jurisprudence back in accord with the reasons for which 
the FAA was drafted and precedent surrounding the applicability of section 
1.  
V. Conclusion and Future Implications 
Transportation and logistics play an integral role in the United States 
economy. In 2017, this sector comprised “8.9 percent of the Nation’s 
economy as measured by gross domestic product.”154 Further, as of 2002, 
independent contractors owned more than 545,000 trucks operated on 
United States roads.
155
  
After New Prime, transportation employers may now find that many of 
the half million contracts they entered into with those independent 
contractors contain invalid arbitration agreements. It is important to note, 
however, that contracting parties may still participate in arbitral 
proceedings even though federal courts may not recognize these arbitration 
agreements as a legal compulsion to do so. Because of this, the true impact 
of New Prime is difficult to ascertain. While the Court’s decision has 
tremendous potential to impact the transportation industry—and the 
nation’s economy as a whole—by forcing disputes into court where costs 
are higher and resolution is often less expeditious, countless factors will 
need to be evaluated before determining the true impact. 
Though it is impossible to predict the future, it is prudent to set forth 
some of the possible questions and considerations that may arise following 
the Court’s decision. The actual economic impact will depend on whether 
transportation workers alleging injury will, in fact, pursue their claims in 
the courts of law. This question likely turns on factors such as a potential 
plaintiff’s knowledge of the law and recognition of a legally cognizable 
injury, a cost-benefit analysis of an alleged injury, and a willingness to 
endure lengthy legal proceedings.  
The scope of the potential impact will depend on whether potential 
plaintiffs can aggregate claims. Litigating individual claims, while likely 
costlier than arbitration, will not have the same economic impact on the 
industry as class action settlements and judgments. However, it may be 
difficult to aggregate claims and assemble a class of plaintiffs large enough 
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to prove worthwhile because control within the transportation industry is 
not highly centralized.
156
  
Further still remains the question of whether transportation employers 
will pass any potential additional cost on to consumers. In an industry with 
such fierce competition and low margins that is already plagued by low 
barriers to entry resulting in an excess of supply,
157
 those who demand 
transportation services may take a “next man up” approach. 
Last, but certainly not least, remains the question of whether talented 
legal drafters will find a way to work around the exemption. While the New 
Prime Court afforded the exemption a generous reach, it surely is not 
without bounds. Should legal drafters engineer a circumvention, the 
discussion of economic impact will be wholly moot. 
Despite all the unknowns, one thing is certain: the text of the Federal 
Arbitration Act, its legislative history, and Supreme Court precedent all 
support the conclusion that New Prime was correctly decided. However, 
only time will tell whether the Court created a free-flowing interstate or a 
massive pile-up when it put the wheels back on independent contracting 
transportation workers’ ride to court. 
 
Reed C. Trechter 
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